서울대학교 법학  45卷，第4期，324-393,2004年出版

这篇文章，最令人印象深刻的，是这句话：To overcome this problem, the author suggests Cass Sunstein's deliberative democracy and Habermas' discourse theory. Both scholars tells us that if we can take democracy not as voting process, but as deliberative process where society members' preferences are transformed (rather than given) by discussing among them about common good, we can prevail over disbelief in democracy. 

 If there was a prevailing trend in the affairs of nations in the past twentieth century it was the increasing role of governments in the allocation of society's resources. Especially in Korea spotlighted as a paragon of “developmental state” among developing countries, the government was deemed to play a decisive role in its economic development. As the government-driven economy reveals its limit at the turn of the century, however, the government is no longer regarded as the institution to achieve social welfare maximization even though there is little doubt that the government is a central institution in the allocation of social resources. With a worldwide sweeping trend of neo-liberalism and globalization, a tough criticism currently arises against governmental intrusion into market economy. The criticism against governments is basically based on disbelief in democracy as a mechanism to efficiently allocate society's resources. Nowadays, a new motto “Don't let the market be left to politics!” is on the verge of becoming a cliché（老生常谈）. This article is particularly planned to suggest counter-arguments against this “market-politics dichotomy” for fear that it should militate in favor of unconditional expansion of market principle. Under the circumstances it seems imperative that we correctly understand pros and cons of democracy vis-a-vis market economy. Part I tries to define democracy and market economy by enumerating differences and similarities between market and collective action. While competitive behavior is present in both the market and public sectors, private-sector action is based on voluntary choice; public-sector action is based on majority rule. While democracy turns on the rule of “one man, one vote”, the market on the rule of “one dollar, one vote.” While the market is a system of effectively proportional representation, the typical issue must be decided “yes” or “no” in political channels. Part II explores the two grounds on which disbelief in democracy is based: ideologically, neo-liberalism and theoretically, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. The voting process can protect democracy against dictatorship, but generally at the cost of social efficiency. Kenneth Arrow successfully proved that there is no democratic collective choice process capable of allocating societal resources efficiently. Against background of Part II's findings, Part III and IV try to reevaluate pros and cons of democracy, historically and theoretically. Pointing out examples such as legal ban against child labor which was once considered as an illegitimate governmental intrusion into market, Part III first claims that the borderline between market and government, varying historically, just reflects the idea of the times. Neo-liberalism is more likely to be another ideology rather than to symbolize the end of history. Part III also suggests that American history is filled with vicissitudes 变迁兴衰of market economy. Part IV tries to refute Arrow's theorem theoretically. Arrow's Theorem implies that any collective choice mechanism which we might design must be imperfect: either efficient but dictatorial or democratic but inefficient. To overcome the dilemma Arrow put us in, Part IV explores some ways to escape from it. Part IV begins with “paper-scissors-rock” theory. It first defines the essential conceptual factors of market and collective action by reaffirming the differences and similarities between market and collective action; second, devises two kinds of games each rule of which respectively embodies the essential conceptual factors of market and collective action; third, applies each rule to game situation; fourth, finds that outcomes of games where each rule is applied are all the same. The theory tells us that if we discard one or more of Arrow's original requirements, there can be an efficient collective choice process. Part IV then relaxes non-dictatorship requirement. Arrow's Theorem itself shows that if we will tolerate a dictator we can satisfy the remaining four requirements. There are problems for the dictator, however. There is nothing in the remaining four requirements that guarantees the other members of society will truthfully reveal their preferences to the dictator. An optimal allocation based on false preferences is a hollow victory. To overcome this problem, the author suggests Cass Sunstein's deliberative democracy and Habermas' discourse theory. Both scholars tells us that if we can take democracy not as voting process, but as deliberative process where society members' preferences are transformed (rather than given) by discussing among them about common good, we can prevail over disbelief in democracy. Part IV's final resort is so-called psychometric paradigm. Here, the author emphasizes the specific ability of collective choice process which market lacks; collective choice process responds better to things, events, and relationships that are not assessed along a single metric. Part V begins by pointing out that neither the institution of markets nor the institution of governments stands as the unarguably preferred means for allocating societal resources. Accordingly, the following question ensues: Under what circumstances are markets or governments the preferred institution for allocating societal resources? Each institution has its own strengths and weaknesses. While markets husband information and respond to variations in individual preferences and abilities, they are often unable to ensure cooperative behavior in many instances. Governments, on the other hand, can enforce a cooperative allocation, but often at the cost of being less responsive than markets to variations in individual preferences and abilities. The central task now before us is to decide just what allocations are best handled by a market process and which are best left to a collective choice process. Reminding us that the borderline between market and government is not a priori, but historical and institutional, Part V concludes that the borderline can be drawn according to the reference point of our choice.